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raises expected unemployment duration, while improving the quality of the resultant job. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, we set up a comprehensive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the 
duration and outcome of individual unemployment spells; ii) the subsequent employment sta-
bility; and iii) the earnings level associated with the first job after unemployment. The model 
is designed to examine short- and long-term impacts of external job search conditions as well 
as of non-random treatment interventions. It is estimated on Norwegian administrative regis-
ter data covering all new unemployment spells from 1993 to 2001. 
It is a well known fact that job search conditions – as reflected in, e.g., unemployment 
insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) – affect the opportunity cost of 
continued job search, and, hence, a job seeker’s fastidiousness and search effort. Participation 
in ALMP potentially also affects human capital and, hence, the distribution of available job 
opportunities. A number of empirical studies have examined how these effects play out with 
respect to the duration and outcome of unemployment spells. Typical findings are that higher 
UI replacement ratios yield longer unemployment durations, and that the probability of escap-
ing unemployment increases as UI entitlements are exhausted. However, in a recent review of 
the literature, Card et al. (2007) show that the estimated behavioral responses tend to be much 
smaller when the spells are measured by the time to next job than when they are measured by 
the time spent in the UI system. The empirical evidence regarding impacts of UI on job match 
quality is sparse. Economic theory suggests that UI may encourage job seekers to wait for 
more productive jobs; see Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999; 
2000). If credit markets are imperfect, UI insurance also involves a non-distortionary income 
(liquidity) effect (in addition to the distortionary substitution effect), reducing the pressure on 
credit-constrained individuals to accept suboptimal job matches (Chetty, 2008). The relatively 
sparse existing empirical evidence does not, however, provide any overwhelming evidence 
that increased UI generosity actually improve job matches. Addison and Blackburn (2000) 
report evidence of a weak favorable impact of UI on the post-unemployment wage, while 
Belzil (2001) and Centeno (2004) report evidence of a small favorable impact on job duration. 
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), however, concludes from a “natural experiment” in Slove-
nia that shortening the duration of UI benefits does not affect either post-unemployment 
wages or job duration. 
The empirical literature on the effects of ALMP is huge, but also somewhat confusing; 
see Kluve et al. (2007) for a recent overview and meta-analysis. One source of confusion is 
that ALMP not only affects actual participants, but also potential participants through antici-  3
pation or “threat” effects (Black et al., 2003), as well as the population at large through vari-
ous general equilibrium effects. But even when it comes to the participants’ direct causal ef-
fects of ALMP, the lack of consensus across studies is conspicuous. One reason for this is that 
ALMP participation involves a series of (potentially conflicting) impacts – on search effort, 
fastidiousness, stigma, and human capital – which play out differently over time. For exam-
ple, we may expect that the job-finding rate declines during the participation period (lock-in 
effect), while it increases afterwards (post-treatment effect). We may also hypothesize that 
completed program participation improves human capital and thereby the quality of subse-
quent job match in terms of earnings and job security. The large variation in reported treat-
ment effects may then simply reflect that different evaluation schemes blend these mecha-
nisms differently.  
To our knowledge, no empirical analysis has yet attempted to examine jointly all the 
direct impacts of UI institutions and ALMP participation on the matching process, in terms of 
effects on job search duration, on the determination of the ultimate destination state, and on 
the quality of a resultant job match. A key aim of the present paper is to fill this gap. In addi-
tion, we believe that the way we extend the multivariate mixed hazards model to incorporate a 
simultaneously determined earnings equation represents a methodological novelty. 
Based on the timing-of-events approach (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003), we set up 
a multivariate hazards model to analyze the transition from unemployment to three alternative 
destination states: i) employment, ii) ordinary education and iii) inactivity (with health related 
benefits or social assistance). During the unemployment spell the job seekers are non-
randomly sorted into ALMP. We examine the causal impacts of job search conditions and of 
actual participation in ALMP on the duration and outcome of job search and on the quality of 
a resultant job. The latter is measured in terms of monthly earnings and employment duration. 
In addition to controlling for a rich set of observed explanatory variables, we allow for jointly 
distributed unobserved heterogeneity by means of the non-parametric maximum likelihood 
estimator (NPMLE). Our preferred model contains a discretely distributed six-dimensional 
vector of unobserved heterogeneity with 27 distinct support-points. 
The key findings of our paper are the following: First, during its first six months, the 
job search process is productive in the sense that the expected earnings increase significantly 
with the time spent searching. On the other hand, the probability of actually obtaining an ac-
ceptable job offer declines quite sharply with unemployment duration. And after one year of 
job search, expected earnings also start to decline. Second, given unemployment duration, 
weaker activation requirements in the UI system cause reservation wages to increase. As a   4
result, it also causes expected unemployment duration to increase and the expected earnings 
level from an accepted job to rise. Third, reservation wages decline sharply in the run-up to 
UI exhaustion, causing the job hazard to rise and the expected earnings level to decline in this 
period. And finally, participation in ALMP initially reduces the employment hazard (lock-in 
effect), but the impact becomes favorable after around 5-6 months of participation. For most 
participants and program durations, the employment hazard is also significantly higher after 
participation than it was before entry into the program. In addition, participation in ALMP 
tends to improve subsequent earnings. Based on model simulations, we summarize the vari-
ous treatment effects of actual participation in terms of a comprehensive earnings (value of 
work) measure, covering a five-year period after the start of unemployment. Even though 
program participation raises both the probability of eventually finding a job and the level of 
earnings given that a job is found, it contributes to reduce overall earnings derived from ordi-
nary jobs during the first five years after entry into unemployment. The reason is that it also 
tends to increase the duration of the overall job search period (including the participation pe-
riod). Given that ALMP also involves some administrative costs, this implies that it is diffi-
cult to defend the programs from a cost-benefit point of view when considering the impacts 
on subsequent employment performance only. However, many of the program activities 
(around 60 percent) involve some form of subsidized employment. The condition for a simple 
five-year cost-benefit analysis to deliver a favorable result is that the economic value of sub-
sidized work is, on average, at least 35 percent of the participants’ predicted earnings from 
non-subsidized work. In addition, activity requirements raise the job finding rate among not-
yet-participating UI claimants. 
The next section presents the data and the institutions from which they are generated. 
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and discusses identification, and Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 discusses alternative model specifications and robustness is-
sues, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data and institutional background 
The data used in this paper encompass all new entrants into registered unemployment in Nor-
way during the period from October 1993 to September 2001. The term “new” is defined as 
not having had any unemployment experience during the past three years prior to the first 
spell in our data window (we use registers back to 1989 to implement this condition for early 
entrants). We focus on new entrants in this analysis in order to model the complete unem-
ployment history for each individual, realizing that there might be causal linkages between   5
subsequent spells and their outcomes. Given that our data window covers 8 years, the delimi-
tation to new entrants does not imply that long-term unemployed and individuals with re-
peated spells are disregarded. Even the longest unemployment careers have to start at some 
point, and given that they start during the period spanned by our data, we model the subse-
quent employment and unemployment experiences until October 2001.  
  Table 1 offers some key descriptive statistics. There are 373,065 individuals included 
in our analysis with 413,988 “new” entries into unemployment. Approximately 41,000 indi-
viduals (11 percent) have more than one new entry during the 8 year long data-window. In the 
statistical analysis, multiple new unemployment spells will be treated as causally unrelated. 
But, as we explain in the next section, they will be related through the assumed persistence of 
unobserved covariates. In total, around 124,000 individuals (33 percent) experienced more 
than one unemployment spell. Repeated unemployment spells starting less than three years 
after the end of a previous spell will be treated as related both through a causal effect (lagged 
duration dependence) and through the persistence of unobservables.  
Table 1 
The Data – Descriptive statistics corresponding to the time of first entry into unemployment 
   
Number of individuals  373,065 
Number of new unemployment entries 1991.9-2001.9*  413,988 
Mean age at first entry  28.22 
Mean number of years of work experience at first entry (conditional on >0)  4.20  (9.03) 
Percent of entrants female  52.25 
Percent of entrants with immigrant (non-OECD) background  9.62 
Percent with UI at first entry  55.40 
   
Percent of individuals according to the number of spells in data window    
One unemployment spell  only  66.73 
Two spells  21.28 
Three spells  7.50 
Four spells or more  4.49 
* A “new” entry is defined as becoming unemployed after at least three years without any unemployment. 
 
The time period covered by our analysis was characterized by substantial changes in 
external job search conditions. First, labor demand fluctuated substantially. This is illustrated 
in the upper panel of Figure 1, where we report a labor market tightness indicator for Norway 
measuring the time-path of the monthly job transition probability controlled for observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics, spell duration, and seasonal fluctuations; see Gaure and 
Røed (2007) for details. Employment prospects improved steadily until the autumn of 1998. 
During the recovery period from the trough in December 1992 (outside our data window) to 
the peak in September 1998, a typical job seeker’s monthly probability of finding work dou-
bled, ceteris paribus. From the autumn of 1998, employment prospects again deteriorated. As   6
can also be seen from the graph, the cyclical fluctuations embodied in the labor market tight-
ness indicator correlate well with the pattern of new inflows to unemployment observed in our 
own data. Second, the overall scale of ALMP also changed substantially. This is illustrated in 
the lower panel of Figure 1, where we show how ALMP intensity – defined as the fraction of 
long-term unemployed job seekers participating in ALMP – developed over time. The figure 
clearly indicates that the frequency of ALMP was scaled down during the late 1990’s, reflect-
ing new political priorities. Third, in the middle of our data period (January 1997), the Nor-
wegian UI system was reformed. The old UI system offered an initial maximum UI duration 
of 80 weeks which could be extended by 13 weeks, after which an additional 80 (+13) week 
period could be granted at a somewhat reduced benefit level if no employment or suitable 
ALMP activities could be found; see Røed and Westlie (2007) for details. The new UI system 
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Figure 1. Labor market tightness (dotted line) and the number of new entrants (solid line) to 
unemployment (upper panel) and the share of long term unemployed participating in labor 
market programs (lower panel). 
Note: The monthly series are smoothed with X11ARIMA. The labor market tightness indicator is collected from 
Gaure and Røed (2007). It is normalized on June 2000 (representing a “normal” cyclical condition) and can be 
interpreted as relative changes in the monthly job transition rates over time, conditional on observed and unob-
served characteristics and on unemployment spell duration. The lower panel shows the fraction of unemployed 
with more than six month unemployment duration that participates in ALMP at each point in time. 
 
Note that we do not interpret the 1997 reform primarily as an increase in the overall 
length of the maximum UI duration. The absolute duration limit was actually higher in the old   7
than in the new regime. The main content of the reform was that the UI system changed from 
focusing on activation to focusing on income insurance and job search. This change in focus 
largely explains the decline in ALMP participation shown in Figure 1. The reform illustrates 
an intimate structural relationship between UI design and activation policies in Norway, aris-
ing from the dominant view that there exists a lower bound on the income level that can be 
offered to unemployed job seekers, regardless of their observed search behavior. In practice, 
this implies that credible UI termination threats can be made only to the extent that paid acti-
vation is offered instead. Hence, the reduction in ALMP-intensity and the removal of the 
“soft” duration constraint after 80 weeks of job search can be viewed as two sides of the same 
coin.  
3.  Methodology 
Starting with the flow of first-time entrants into the state of unemployment, we set up a multi-
variate mixed semi-proportional hazard rate model (MMSPH), expanded to comprise a log-
linear earnings equation for those who get an ordinary job. The model accounts for transitions 
to employment, to ordinary education, and to social security benefits that do not require con-
tinued job search (sickness benefits, rehabilitation benefits, disability benefits or social assis-
tance). During the unemployment spell, transitions to ALMP may occur. ALMP participation 
is modeled as a non-random event, and it is assumed to induce shifts in all hazard rates, both 
during the participation period and afterwards. The sizes of the shifts may depend on gender, 
initial human capital, program duration, and business cycle conditions. All hazard rates are 
potentially affected by the duration of the ongoing spell, as well as by the duration and out-
come of previous spells. All hazards are also affected by UI status (before/after the UI reform) 
and by the duration of remaining UI entitlements. For individuals who make a transition to 
employment, it is assumed that the initial earnings level and the subsequent job-loss hazard, 
depend on the conditions under which the job was accepted (in terms of, e.g., remaining UI 
entitlements at the time of the job transition) and on previous ALMP participation. All hazard 
rates as well as earnings are assumed to depend on observed and unobserved characteristics 
and on calendar time. The various unobserved characteristics (random effects) are allowed to 
be interrelated in an unrestricted fashion, implying that the parameters of the model are recov-
ered by means of the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE); see Heckman 
and Singer (1984) and Gaure et al. (2007).   8
3.1  Model specification 
We set up a multivariate mixed semi-proportional hazard rate model with five events 
k=1,...,5, together with an earnings equation. The five events are: 
1.  Termination of the unemployment spell with transition to employment 
2.  Termination of the unemployment spell with transition to ordinary education 
3.  Termination of the unemployment spell with transition to other benefit (that does not 
require continued job search) 
4.  Entry into ALMP (does not terminate the unemployment spell) 
5.  Termination of a subsequent employment spell 
 
All the five hazard rates, as well as expected earnings level, are tied together through 
the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. While we model the entry into ALMP 
(k=4) as an endogenous event, we treat the potential duration of program participation (in the 
absence of unemployment termination) as exogenous. This is a questionable strategy. Al-
though the length of each ALMP activity is indeed predetermined, we cannot rule out a sys-
tematic (unobserved) sorting process into programs of different durations. This may bias the 
results regarding the impacts of ALMP duration in an unknown direction (depending on the 
sorting process into programs of differential durations). 
For each transition into ordinary employment (k=1), we also include an earnings equa-
tion designed to explain the level of earnings derived from the first full month of employment. 
Monthly earnings are determined as the product of the hourly wage rate and the number of 
hours worked. Unfortunately, the data do not provide sufficient information for identifying 
these two variables separately. Note, however, that all the job seekers included in our analysis 
have declared interest in a full-time job. High monthly earnings may therefore be viewed as a 
desirable job characteristic, even when it results from a large number of hours rather than a 
high hourly wage. Note also that we treat self-employment as a transition to employment. The 
initial earnings level for self-employed are computed from yearly tax records (based on the 
assumption that earnings were equally distributed across the non-unemployment months). 
When a job spell is terminated (k=5), the worker may return to unemployment, in 
which case a new unemployment spell is started off. Otherwise, the event history is termi-
nated at this point.
1 The model is proportional, in the sense that unobserved as well as most 
                                                 
1 Note that it is the length of the employment status that we model. Switches between different jobs are dis-
regarded.   9
observed covariates are assumed to affect individual hazard rates multiplicatively. However, 
as we explain below, the model is a generalization of the standard MMPH model, since it al-
lows for interactions of duration dependencies and the impact of some observed explanatory 
variables. This is why we use the term “semi-proportional” – MMSPH – to describe it. 
Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the events recorded in the data. A key point 
to note is that only 47 percent of the completed spells end with a transition directly to em-
ployment. The remaining transitions are evenly distributed between education, benefit shift-
ing, and other (non-modeled) transitions. The latter include child-birth (for females), military 
service (for males), self-supported withdrawal from the labor force, emigration, and death. 
Spells with “other” transition are right-censored.  Another important point to note is that em-
ployment obtained after a period of unemployment is fragile; 41 percent of the employment 
spells are terminated within two years of employment, and 43 percent of these employment 
terminations lead directly back to the unemployment pool. Mean monthly earnings for those 
who get a job are around 26.000 NOK (3.250 €). The variation is large, however, with a stan-
dard deviation around 60 percent. 
Table 2 
Overview of events/outcomes recorded in the data 
Number of unemployment spells  608,126 
Percent of unemployment spells completed before the end of the observation period  94.21 
Mean duration of completed spells (months)  5.23 
   
Percent of unemployment spells ending in:   
Employment  46.59 
Education  16.87 
Other benefit (sickness, rehabilitation, disability, or social assistance)  16.71 
Other (right censored transitions)  19.83 
   
Percent of completed unemployment spells involving ALMP  17.12 
   
Percent of employment spells completed  within two years  41.13 
   
Percent of completed employment spells ending in unemployment  43.03 
   
Mean monthly earnings from employment in the first months after unemployment (2006 NOK)  26,292 
Standard deviation  log monthly employment earnings  0.602 
 
Since we observe labor market status by the end of each calendar month only, we set 
up the statistical model directly in terms of grouped hazard rates (Prentice and Gloeckler, 
1978; Meyer, 1990). We write the integrated period-specific hazard rates  kit ϕ  as functions of 
observed (time-varying) variables and unknown parameters represented by index functions 
fkit, and (time-invariant) unobserved individual characteristics vki:   10
  ()
1
exp ,   1,...,5,
t
kit kis kit ki
t
ds f v k ϕθ
−
==+= ∫  (1) 
where  kis θ is the underlying continuous-time hazard rate, assumed to be constant within each 
month. In addition, we specify monthly earnings at the start of the new job as 
  ( ) 66 exp it it i i wf v ε =+ + , (2) 
where  6it f is an index function of observed explanatory variables, v6i is an unobserved indi-
vidual characteristic, and εi is an error term reflecting genuine randomness in earnings out-
comes at the individual level. The latter is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance 
2 σ . We write the index functions for the transitions from unemployment as fol-
lows: 
 
*log( ) ,   1,...,4,
scal
kit kt it kdt it k it it k it kit it k it fsd d c rz x k τλ λ δ α β =+ + + + + =  (3) 
where sit is a vector of calendar month dummy variables (one for each calendar month occur-
ring in our data), dit is a vector of spell duration dummy variables (including a representation 
of ‘lagged’ duration from recent previous spells), 
scal
it d is a spell duration scalar variable, cit is 
a monthly business cycle indicator (see Figure 1, Section 2), rit is a vector of dummy variables 
reflecting UI status/regime and the length of remaining UI entitlements,  z it is a vector of 
dummy variables recording already realized endogenous events (on-going and completed 
treatment and outcome of previous unemployment spells), and xit is a vector of individual 
characteristics (age, education, work-experience, previous income, the level of UI benefits, 
family status, nationality, and business cycle conditions at the time of first entry).
2 Note that 
the effects of endogenous events () kit α vary over individuals as well as time. The reason for 
this is that we allow the causal effects of ALMP to depend on some key individual character-
istics (gender and education), on the duration of ongoing and completed treatment, and on the 
current business cycle conditions. The impacts of spell duration are to some extent allowed to 
vary over the business cycle through the interaction of spell duration with business cycle con-
ditions. The parameters associated with the spell duration dummy variables() kdt λ reflect dura-
tion dependence under “normal” cyclical conditions. A more detailed description of the model 
(and its variables) will be given as we present the estimation results in the next section.  
  The index function for the transition from employment is written as: 
                                                 
2 The business cycle condition at the time of first entry is included as an individual covariate to capture the 
potential sorting in the inflow to unemployment over the cycle.   11
 
**
55 55 5 5 5 5 ln , it i i it it i i t it f drd z wcx λδλ α ψ τβ =+ + + + + +  (4) 
where  i d is the duration of the completed job search period,  i r reflects the remaining UI enti-
tlement at the time of the job transition, 
*
it d is the duration of the ongoing employment spell, 
i z is a vector of indicators for realized treatment and part-time work, and  i w is the the realized 
level of monthly earnings.   
  The index function for monthly earnings is written as 
  66 66 6 6 , it i i it ii t it f dr zcx λδα τβ =+ + + +  (5) 
where t here refers to the month of transition into employment.  
A point to note is that all the variables explaining expected acceptable earnings (5) are 
also assumed to have direct effects on the various hazard rates. Hence, given the unrestricted 
correlation between unobserved covariates, the level of expected earnings is implicitly in-
cluded in all the hazard rates.  
3.2  Identification 
Even though we apply a (semi) proportional hazard rate model, we emphasize that non-
parametric identification does not rely solely on the proportionality assumption. Additional 
sources of identification are the existence of repeat spells (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) 
and, more importantly, the abundance of exogenous time-varying covariates (McCall, 1994; 
Brinch, 2007; Gaure et al., 2007). Of particular value for identification purposes is the sub-
stantial calendar time variation in both labor market tightness and in the scale of labor market 
programs; see Section 2. As pointed out by Eberwein et al. (1997, p. 663), time-varying vari-
ables naturally provide an exclusion restriction in the sense that past values of these variables 
affect the current outcomes only through the already realized selection process. Hence, they 
facilitate the disentanglement of causal treatment and duration effects from impacts of unob-
served sorting. Note that we do not require the calendar time variation in the treatment pro-
pensity to be independent of the cyclical variation in, e.g., the employment hazard. Since we 
include a full set of calendar time dummy variables in all hazard rates, the non-independent 
variation is fully (non-parametrically) controlled for in the model. The identification of treat-
ment effects also relies on the “no anticipation assumption” (Abbring and Van den Berg, 
2003), requiring that individuals do not anticipate the realization of the stochastic process de-
termining treatment events. Since treatments are typically implemented quickly once the rele-
vant decision is made, we view this assumption as defensible.    12
Our data make it possible to identify separately the degree of intrinsic duration depend-
ence related to discouragement and/or statistical discrimination and the impact of UI exhaus-
tion. An important source of identification for these parameters is the 1997 UI reform, which 
introduced an exogenous break in the otherwise strong positive correlation between unem-
ployment duration and UI exhaustion (see Section 2). Participation in ALMP also contributes 
to the separation of duration and UI exhaustion effects, since many participants do not draw 
on their UI entitlements while participating in a program activity. Based on two additional 
assumptions, we can also identify the impacts of the UI reform on the initial hazard rates (be-
fore exhaustion effects kick in) and on the subsequent job quality. The first assumption is that 
non-claimants did not change their behavior as a result of the reform, i.e., that any “eligibility 
effects” are negligible. Given that the ultimate maximum UI duration was virtually unaffected 
by the reform, we find this assumption justifiable. The second assumption is that business cy-
cle fluctuations had the same impact on UI claimants (who were affected by the reform) as 
they had on non-claimants (who presumably were not affected by the reform). Røed and Wes-
tlie (2007) presents empirical evidence indicating that this was indeed the case. However, we 
cannot entirely rule out that what we will refer to as the “reform effect” also captures other 
developments that have affected insured and non-insured job-seekers differently. 
3.3  The likelihood function 
Let Kit be the set of feasible events for individual i in month t, i.e.,  { } 1, 2,3, 4 it K = when 
openly unemployed,  { } 1, 2,3 it K =  when participating in ALMP, and { } 5 it K =  when em-
ployed. Let  kit y , k=1,…,5, be an outcome indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the corre-
sponding observation month ended in a transition to state k, and zero otherwise, let wit be ob-
served initial earnings for individual i who made an employment transition at time t, and let Yi 
be the complete set of outcome indicators available for individual i (potentially collected from 
multiple spells with multiple earnings observations). The contribution to the likelihood func-
tion formed by the event pattern of a particular individual, conditional on the vector of unob-
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In order to arrive at the marginal likelihood, we need to integrate the six-dimensional 
vector of unobserved heterogeneity  i v  out of Equation (6). Standard techniques for doing this 
rest on the assumption that the unobserved covariates are orthogonal to all other explanatory 
variables in the model at the time of first entry.  However, for interval censored data of the 
type used here, this assumption is violated. The reason for this is that the interval censoring 
creates a left-truncation problem, i.e., some individuals with only very short spells - those 
starting and ending in the same month – are never recorded. Consequently, we have a selected 
sample, in which unobserved heterogeneity cannot be assumed independent of either observed 
covariates or calendar time, since the impact of unobserved heterogeneity during the first 
(censored) month depends on the values of all other explanatory variables. The solution to 
this problem is to set up the likelihood function conditional on the first spell surviving to the 
first observation point, and use Bayes’ theorem to derive the appropriate distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity. We assume that the entrances to the origin state are uniformly distrib-
uted within each calendar month. Let  1i t be the first inflow month of the first spell for individ-
ual i. The probability of surviving the inflow month – i.e., of being included in the analysis 
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If ( ) i f v denotes the unconditional heterogeneity density function (at the time of first entry 
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To ensure that our estimation results to the largest possible extent are driven by the 
data and not by unjustified restrictions on the heterogeneity distribution, we introduce unob-
served heterogeneity non-parametrically by means of the non-parametric maximum-
likelihood estimator (NPMLE). In practice, this implies that the vectors of unobserved attrib-
utes are jointly discretely distributed (Lindsay, 1983) with the number of mass-points chosen 
by adding location vectors until it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood function 
(Heckman and Singer, 1984). Assuming that the unobserved covariates are jointly discretely 
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where  { } , , 1,2,... , ll vq l Q =  are the location vectors and probabilities characterizing the het-
erogeneity distribution, and the functions  (.), (.) ii P S  are defined in (6) and (7), respectively. 
We use the optimization algorithm described in Gaure et al. (2007). 
4.  Main Results 
Our model contains around 1,700 estimated parameters. Most of them are included solely for 
control purposes and are unimportant for the topics discussed in this paper. Hence, we do not 
present the results in any detail. A complete list of estimation results is posted on our website 
www.frisch.uio.no/docs/job_search.html. Some alternative models and robustness checks are 
provided in the next section. In this section, we focus on key results related to duration de-
pendence, UI institutions and activation requirements, ALMP treatment effects, and other re-
sults of economic interest. The results are presented in terms of individual parameter esti-
mates (relative hazard rates) and full simulation exercises. We present the results from the 
preferred model, which was selected on the basis of the Akaike information criterion (AIC); 
see Gaure et al. (2007) for a justification of this choice. This model required 27 support points 
in the heterogeneity distribution. The results are highly robust to the exact number of support 
points, however, at least as long as the number lies somewhere between 15 and 35; see Sec-
tion 5.4.    15
4.1  Duration dependence and the impact of past unemployment 
We start out presenting the so-called baseline hazards for the four events potentially occurring 
during job search; see Figure 2. The graphs are normalized to unity for the first duration 
month and display the degrees of duration dependencies during a first unemployment spell 
under “normal” (average) business cycle conditions. The baseline hazards are computed net of 
any direct UI exhaustion effects, i.e., they are drawn “as if” potential UI duration is open-
ended (see next subsection). There is clearly negative duration dependence in the employ-
ment, education, and ALMP participation hazards.
3 The other-benefit-hazard is relatively sta-
ble, with weak negative duration dependence initially, followed by positive duration depend-
ence. Our model also includes an interaction term between spell duration and a monthly labor 
market tightness indicator (see Section 2). We find that the degree of negative duration de-
pendence in the job hazard is stronger the tighter the labor market (not shown), indicating that 
stigma associated with long-term unemployment is triggered faster in good times than in bad 
times. Moving from the worst observed to the best observed cyclical conditions implies that 
the job hazard rate of a long-term unemployed (12 months) relative to that of a new entrant 
declines by around 3.5 percent, ceteris paribus.
4 
Job search duration also affects the expected quality of the job match. Figure 3 dis-
plays the estimated impacts of job search duration on subsequent earnings and employment 
stability. A key finding is that a longer job search period pays off in terms of higher expected 
earnings once a job is obtained. This is consistent with the notion that job search is a produc-
tive endeavor. However, there is no additional earnings gain associated with job search be-
yond approximately 6 months, and after 15 months the impact of lengthening the search pe-
riod becomes negative. The latter finding may reflect human capital depreciation, statistical 
discrimination against long-term unemployment, or a reduction in reservation wages arising 
from learning (more realistic assessment of earnings options) or from liquidity constraints. It 
is also worth noting that longer job search periods do apparently not result in safer jobs. 
                                                 
3 Note that the large drop in the education hazard after a few months of job search most likely arises from 
students seeking work during their summer breaks.   
4 Unemployment experiences from previous spells are also allowed to causally affect the hazard rates out 
of unemployment provided that they were completed less than three years prior to the start of the ongoing spell 
(otherwise they are linked to the current spell only through the common vector of unobserved covariates).  The 
impact of unemployment experience from previous spells on current hazard rates depend on the outcome of 
those spells. We do not report these results here, except noting that past short unemployment spells (less than 12 
months) with successful outcomes (in the sense that they ended with a job) have negligible effects on the out-
come of subsequent spells. Longer previous spells, and spells without a successful outcome, have more adverse 
effects on the outcome of subsequent spells, particularly if the spells are close in time. 
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Figure 2. The estimated unemployment duration effects on the hazard rates out of unemploy-
ment, with 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Note: All effects are normalized on the first month and reflect relative changes in hazard rates as duration in-
creases, ceteris paribus. The reported duration effects in panels 1-5 apply for a new entrant to unemployment 
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Figure 3. The impact of completed unemployment duration on earnings and employment sta-
bility, with 95 percent confidence interval  
 
Job security improves rapidly with tenure. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where we 
display the estimated baseline hazard for the termination of jobs found after unemployed job 
search (note that we now measure employment duration, and not unemployment duration, on   17
the horizontal axis). The monthly probability of ending a newly obtained employment status 

































Figure 4. The estimated employment duration effect on the hazard rate out of employment, 
with 95 percent confidence intervals.  
Note: The effect is normalized on the first month and reflect relative changes in hazard rates as employment du-
ration increases, ceteris paribus.  
4.2  The impacts of the UI system 
The UI system is represented in the model by UI regime dummy variables (see Section 2) and 
by a vector of dummy variables “counting down” to UI exhaustion during the six months just 
prior to benefit termination.
5  
The effects of UI regime are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Compared with entrants be-
longing to the pre-1997 UI system, non-eligible entrants have lower employment and educa-
tion hazards and a higher sickness/disability hazard. It is also worth noting that non-eligible 
job searchers tend to accept around 9 percent lower earnings than eligible job searchers, ce-
teris paribus. These effects must be interpreted with care since UI eligibility is not assigned 
randomly.
6 However, the causal impacts of the 1997 reform are identified, provided that the 
reform did not affect the behavior of the non-eligible and that economic fluctuations affected 
eligible and non-eligible job seekers in a similar fashion; see Section 3. The results reported in 
                                                 
5 We also include a dummy indicating close contact between job searcher and case worker. This dummy is 
equal to one during UI application periods. An application period occurs when an eligible individual starts a new 
unemployment spell, unless he/she continues to draw on existing UI entitlements (if a previous spell was con-
cluded less than 12 months ago). An application period also occurs after exhaustion of the initial 80 week period 
in the pre-1997 UI system; see Røed and Westlie (2007) for details. Application periods entail a relatively close 
contact with the employment office, including the sorting out of potential job opportunities. 
 
6 UI eligibility requires that yearly labor earnings exceeded approximately 60,000 NOK in the year prior to 
the start of the unemployment spell (or that the average income during the past three years exceeded that 
amount).   18
Table 3 indicate that the reform caused negative shifts in all hazard rates out of unemploy-
ment. Other things equal, the employment hazard fell by around 17 percent (100×(1-exp(-
0.188)). It is also clear from Table 4 that the transition to a less activation oriented regime 
caused an improvement in the quality of accepted jobs, conditional on unemployment dura-
tion. Earnings increased by around 5 percent, while the subsequent employment termination 
hazard declined by 3 percent.  
Table 3 
The effects of UI entitlements on hazard rates 
 Employment  Education  Other  benefit  ALMP 
  Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. 
UI regime in ongoing unemploy-
ment spell 
        
UI  entitlement  before  1997    ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
UI  entitlement  from  1997  -0.188 0.009  -0.417 0.018  -0.357 0.017  -0.113 0.015 
No  UI  entitlement  -0.190 0.011  -0.030 0.020 0.530 0.021 0.455 0.017 
 
Table 4 
The effects of UI entitlements on job quality 
  Employment termination  Log monthly earnings 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
UI regime in completed unemployment spell         
UI entitlement before 1997   ref.    ref.   
UI entitlement from 1997  -0.032  0.012  0.049  0.003 
No UI entitlement  0.024  0.017  -0.090  0.005 
 
Figure 5 displays the estimated shape of the hazard rates in the run-up to UI exhaus-
tion, relative to claimants with more than six months left of their UI period. Unsurprisingly, 
all hazard rates rise significantly as the moment of benefit exhaustion approaches. In addition 
both employment and education hazards remain at a relatively high level after exhaustion. An 
explanation for the drop in the hazards to other benefits and ALMP may be that those who 
remain unemployed after UI exhaustion also to a large extent have exhausted their options in 
terms of other benefits and ALMP offers.  
Exhaustion of UI benefits also affects fastidiousness and reservation wages; see Figure 
6. We find that realized earnings are significantly lower for jobs accepted in the run-up to UI 
exhaustion than for jobs accepted earlier in the unemployment spell. For jobs accepted during 
the last two months of the UI period, the earnings loss (compared to a situation with more 
than six months left) is close to 10 percent. This indicates that the reservation wage indeed 
declines significantly as UI entitlements are exhausted. However, jobs accepted after UI ex-
haustion are again associated with somewhat higher earnings and employment stability than 
jobs accepted in the run-up to exhaustion. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the 
impact of UI exhaustion on the reservation wage is really heterogeneous across individuals (in   19
contrast to the model’s assumption of a homogeneous effect), and that individuals with the 























































Figure 5. The impacts of UI exhaustion on hazard rates out of open unemployment, with 95 
percent confidence intervals 






























































Figure 6. The impacts of UI exhaustion on the expected quality of the accepted job, with 95 
percent confidence intervals 
Note: The graphs are normalized on a situation with more than six months left of the UI period. 
  In order to summarize the impacts of the 1997 UI-reform, we perform a simulation 
exercise; i.e., we use the estimated model to simulate the outcomes (in terms of unemploy-
ment duration, destination state, and – if the destination state is employment – earnings and 
employment duration) of all insured unemployment spells under the old and the new regime, 
ceteris paribus. We restrict attention to the outcomes of each individual’s first unemployment 
spell, since repeat spells are only partly modeled. In the simulation exercises, we keep busi-
ness cycles and other time-varying covariates constant (at their mean levels), implying that we 
can eliminate the right-censoring problem present in the real data (we follow all spells for up   20
to five years, even if they stretch beyond our data window). The pre and post reform simula-
tions are different only with respect to the value of the appropriate regime variables, except 
that the calendar time effects in the treatment hazard are scaled such that they are equal to 
their estimated pre and post reform averages, respectively, implying that the treatment hazard 
is approximately 30 percent higher in the pre than in the post reform regime, ceteris paribus. 
In order to obtain confidence intervals for our simulation results, we use a parametric boot-
strap procedure, i.e., we draw parameter estimates repeatedly from their joint normal distribu-
tion.
7 In total, we make 120 simulations under each regime, and calculate 95 percent confi-
dence intervals for the statistics of interest.  
Table 5 
Simulated impacts of the 1997 UI reform 
 I  II  III 
  Based on the pre-
1997 system. All 
unemployed are 
entitled to 2*80 
weeks of UI-
insurance 
Based on the af-
ter-1997 system. 
All unemployed 





[95% CI in 
brackets] 
Outcomes of the first unemployment spell      
Percent of unemployment spells ending in       
Employment 69.53  72.22  2.69 
[2.01, 3.35] 
Education 14.63  12.81  -1.82 
[-2.20, -1.34] 
Other benefit  15.15  13.81  -1.34 
[-1.82, -0.69] 
Censored due to end of observation period  0.68  1.16  0.47 
[0.35, 0.60] 
Mean duration of unemployment spells (months)  6.61  8.41  1.80 
[1.65,1.97] 
Outcomes of the first employment spell      
Mean monthly earnings first employment spell  30,813  32,132  1,319 
[1086, 1510] 
Fraction of employment spells terminated within 
first year after employment transition 
27.09 27.22  0.13 
[-0.75, 0.56] 
 
The results are provided in Table 5. They show that the reform (the introduction of a 
single uninterrupted 3-year UI period with limited activity requirements) caused mean unem-
ployment duration to increase by 1.8 months (around 27 percent). The rise in unemployment 
duration was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of unemployment spells ending 
                                                 
7 We draw parameters attached to observed explanatory variables only, since heterogeneity parameters are 
not normally distributed; see Gaure et al. (2007). The drawings of parameter estimates are made by means of the 
Cholesky decomposition; i.e., let L be a lower triangular matrix, such that the estimated covariance matrix is 
' VL L =  . Let zs be a vector of drawings from the standard normal distribution collected for trial s. Let  ˆ b  be the 
vector of point-estimates. The parameters drawn for trial s are then given as  ˆ
s s bb L z =+ . 
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with a transition to employment (by 2.7 percentage points). In line with the findings reported 
in Table 4, we also find that realized first-job-earnings increased by around 4.3 percent as a 
result of the reform. 
4.3  The impacts of ALMP  
The estimated direct impacts of ALMP participation on events during the job search period 
are presented in Table 6. For both on-program and post-program effects we first report the 
estimated effects for a reference individual (defined at the bottom of the table). The associated 
relative shift in the hazard rates due to program participation is obtained by taking the expo-
nential function of these numbers. For each combination of explanatory variables, the ALMP 
effects on the hazard rates can be computed as the appropriate product of variables and pa-
rameter estimates reported in the subsequent rows.  
Table 6 
Effects of ALMP participation on hazard rates during the participation period and afterwards 
 Employment  Education  Other  benefit  ALMP 
  Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. 
On-program effect for ref-
erence participant  -0.363 0.014 -0.285 0.021 -0.753 0.024    
+ deviation from 4 month 
ongoing program duration 
(ln(duration)-ln(4)) 
0.805 0.010 0.801 0.015 0.257 0.015 
  
+  male  0.117 0.015 -0.077 0.021 0.028 0.024     
+ deviation from mean edu-
cation (years)  0.045 0.004 -0.014 0.006 0.039 0.008    
+ deviation from mean cy-
clical conditions  0.323 0.057 0.771 0.089 0.131 0.090    
Post-program effect for ref-
erence participant  0.196 0.017 0.065 0.030 0.015 0.027 0.519 0.018 
+ deviation from 4 month 
completed program dura-
tion (ln(duration)-ln(4)) 
0.174 0.012 0.228 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.076 0.011 
+  male  0.014 0.020 -0.065 0.036 0.074 0.028 0.182 0.018 
+ deviation from mean edu-
cation (years)  0.027 0.006 0.013 0.011 -0.020 0.010 0.096 0.005 
+ deviation from mean cy-
clical conditions  0.153 0.077 0.171 0.145 0.186 0.113 0.115 0.082 
          
Reference: female participant, 4 months program duration, 12 years education, and “normal” business cycle con-
ditions. 
 
  A key finding is that ALMP participation reduces the employment hazard sharply dur-
ing the initial stages of participation (lock-in effect), but that the effect gradually becomes less 
negative as the treatment is continued. For a typical participant, the employment effect be-
comes positive after 5-6 months of participation. ALMP also raises the employment hazard 
after completion of the program, compared to the pre-participation period (post-program ef-
fect). A general finding is that the favorable effects of ALMP are largest for men and for per-  22
sons with high education. The effects are also more favorable in a tight than in a slack labor 
market. The finding of a more favorable treatment effect the higher the educational attainment 
contrasts with the previously reported negative interaction effect reported by Røed and Raaum 
(2006). However, their analysis was limited to insured unemployment spells, and all exits 
from unemployment were aggregated into a single destination state. 
Participation in ALMP also potentially affects the quality of a subsequent job; see Ta-
ble 7. We find that very short ALMP’s tend to have a negative impact on both earnings and 
job stability. For a typical worker, the earnings effect varies from minus five percent for very 
short programs (one month) to plus 10 percent for long programs (nine months). Longer pro-
grams also tend to improve job stability, with a reduction in the job termination hazard of 
around five percent, ceteris paribus. As discussed in Section 3.1, we cannot rule out that dif-
ferential results by treatment duration reflect sorting into programs of different lengths. 
Table 7 
Effects of ALMP participation on  the quality of a realized job 
  Employment termination  Log monthly earnings 
 Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
Effect of program reference  0.051 0.019 0.040 0.005 
+ completed program duration (ln(duration)-ln(4))  -0.138 0.012 0.070 0.003 
+  male  -0.074 0.019  -0.019 0.005 
+ deviation from mean education (years)  -0.016  0.006  0.006  0.001 
+ deviation from mean cyclical conditions  -0.025  0.068  0.030  0.022 
Reference: female participant, 4 months program duration, 12 years education, and “normal” business cycle con-
ditions. 
 
  In order to evaluate the overall impact of ALMP, we perform a simulation exercise 
similar to the one described in the previous subsection, only this time we manipulate the im-
pacts of ALMP. More specifically, we compare simulations based on the estimated model 
with simulations based on the same estimated model, with the important exception that 
ALMP is assumed irrelevant (the impacts on all final destination hazards are set to zero). The 
latter simulations represent the no-treatment-world, with the important qualification that it 
does not remove the effects that a given program structure may have on search behavior other 
than through actual participation. Note, however, that the group of participants is identified 
even in the no-treatment world, based on exactly the same sorting process as in the treatment 
world (the only difference is that treatment is completely irrelevant in the non-treatment 
world). This implies that we can compare the group of treated individuals with and without 
actual treatment. It also implies that we can characterize the sorting process into treatment. 
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Table 8 
Overall effects of ALMP participation 













[95% CI in 
brackets] 
Outcomes of the first unemployment spell        
Percent of unemployment spells ending in         
Employment 55.69  47.25  49.32  2.07 
[1.46, 2.79] 
Education 25.72  25.10  23.52  -1.58 
[-2.15, -0.93] 
Other benefit  18.16  25.03  24.98  -0.05 
[-0.70, 0.60] 
Censored due to end of observation period  0.42  2.62  2.18  -0.43 
[-0.63, -0.25] 
Mean duration of unemployment spells  5.19  13.95  15.18  1.23 
[1.04, 1.41] 
Share of population  84.31  15.69  15.69  0.00 
[-0.16, 0.19] 
Outcomes of the first employment spell        
Mean monthly earnings first employment 
spell 
27,967 25,265  25,908  642   
 [288, 1,043] 
Percent of employment spells terminated 
within first year after employment transition 
29.63 35.12  36.54  1.42 
[0.40, 2.58] 
Overall earnings and costs first five years 
after entry into unemployment 
      
A. Total mean earnings generated per partici-
pant in ordinary (non-subsidized) jobs 
1,056,245 700,667  689,739  -10,928 
[-20,851, 371] 
Share of population  73.45  26.55  26.55  0.00 
[-0.20, 0.18]. 
Mean number of months in ALMP per par-
ticipant 
- - 5.73   
Mean number of months in unemployment 
(including ALMP participation) 
9.85 19.33  20.47  1.14 
[0.99, 1.23] 
Mean number of months in ordinary em-
ployment 
38.39 27.72  26.73  -0.99 
[-1.21, -0.71] 
B. Total mean economic value generated 
through program participation (subsidized 
jobs) per participant 
 0  45,130  45,130 
C. Total mean operating cost of ALMP per 
participant 
 0  21,086  21,086 
D. ALMP net surplus per participant (A+B-C)        13,116 
[3,193,24,415] 
Note: Sum earnings are calculated on the basis of the assumption that the earnings levels remain constant within 
employment spell. Effect measures per participant (Column III) are calculated by dividing the difference be-
tween the ALMP and the non-ALMP worlds on the fraction of actual participants in the world with ALMP. Out-
comes for ALMP participants in the non-ALMP world are computed by subtracting the effect (Column III) from 
the outcome with ALMP (Column I). 
 
   The results are provided in Table 8. The first two columns summarize the outcomes 
for non-participants and participants in the absence of any treatment effects. The results indi-
cate that there is a negative selection into ALMP. The likelihood of ending up in employment 
is on average 8.4 percentage points higher for non-participants than for participants, and their   24
earnings are around 11 percent higher, given that they do find a job. Non-participants’ unem-
ployment spells are also on average almost 9 months shorter than those of participants, but 
this primarily reflects that the participation probability rises with the time at risk. The causal 
impacts of ALMP are assessed by comparing the outcomes for the group of participants in the 
treatment and the non-treatment worlds, see Column IV. They show that program participa-
tion increases the probability that a job search period ends with a job by approximately 2 per-
centage points. It also increases the level of participants’ realized monthly earnings by around 
640 NOK, or 2.5 percent. However, these favorable effects come at the cost of an increase in 
expected unemployment duration (including the participation period) of around 1.2 months, 
or around 9 percent. 
In order to compare program benefits with program costs over a longer period of time, 
we simulate the progression of unemployment and employment spells for a full five-year pe-
riod after entry into unemployment. Repeat spells start endogenously whenever a job termina-
tion is simulated. Individuals making transitions to education or other benefits are allowed to 
return to unemployment later on according to drawings from lotteries based on observed re-
turn-frequencies. A simple measure of the overall program effect is obtained by adding up all 
earnings generated from ordinary employment in the treatment and no-treatment worlds, re-
spectively. This exercise indicates that over a five-year period, the adverse treatment effects 
(longer unemployment durations) dominate the favorable effects (higher employment and 
higher monthly earnings). However, some ALMP’s clearly involve work of direct economic 
value. Around 60 percent of the program activities are employment programs in which pre-
sumably useful work is carried out, and the economic value of this work should be included in 
a cost-benefit evaluation; see Jespersen et al. (2008). It is of course difficult to assess this 
value, but since the program provider does not face the total wage cost, it is probably well be-
low the participants’ full earnings potentials. Job subsidies to private sector jobs are typically 
limited to a maximum of 50 percent of the wage bill, suggesting that the value of the work is 
likely to exceed 50 percent of actual earnings for these jobs. For work training schemes, the 
subsidy may be as high as 100 percent. The calculations provided in Table 8 are based on the 
assumption that subsidized work on average is worth 50 percent of the earnings level pre-
dicted for non-subsidized work. ALMP also involves administrative costs. Cost assessments 
made by the Public Employment Service (PES) suggest that the mean cost of providing 
ALMP in Norway – excluding all transfers to the participant – amounts to 3,620 NOK per   25
month.
8 Taking both the value of work within programs and the administrative costs of pro-
viding them into account, a simple comparison of costs and benefits during a five year period 
(upon entering unemployment) suggests that the programs are cost-effective. However, this 
conclusion is highly sensitive towards the valuation of work carried out within employment 
programs. For the cost-benefit analysis to yield a positive result, this value must on average 
exceed around 35 percent of expected earnings in non-subsidized jobs. 
4.4  The role of human capital, economic incentives and family situation 
The job seeker’s human capital is of great importance, both with respect to the duration and 
outcome of the unemployment spell and with respect to job quality. Higher education and 
more work experience (conditional on age) imply shorter unemployment and higher probabil-
ity of getting a job, and also higher earnings and more secure employment given that a job is 
found. Comparing, for example, a PhD education with a 12 year secondary education, the job 
hazard is approximately 40 percent higher, the earnings level is 42 percent higher, and the 
employment termination hazard is 47 percent lower, ceteris paribus. 
It is difficult to evaluate the impacts of economic incentives embedded in the level of 
UI payments, since the benefit variation in our data is non-random. The estimated UI benefit 
elasticity in the employment hazard is -0.039 (0.001) (standard error in parenthesis). In the 
earnings equation, the elasticity is estimated to the negligible level of -0.004 (0.0005). How-
ever, the former of these estimates is much smaller than previously found on similar data with 
exploitation of random-assignment-like variation in UI benefits (Røed and Zhang, 2003; 
2005); hence we view our results at this point with suspicion. 
We also investigate the impact of the realized earnings level – i.e. the draw from the in-
dividual log-normal earnings distribution – on the employment termination process. The elas-
ticity of the employment termination hazard with respect to the earnings level is estimated to 
0.254 (0.016), i.e., a 10 percent increase in monthly earnings implies a 2.5 percent increase in 
the job termination hazard. This relationship is most likely driven by involuntary job termina-
tions, and indicates that higher earnings (conditional on human capital variables) to some ex-
tent compensate for insecure jobs.  
We have found that family situation – in terms of the number and age of children – has 
a substantial impact on the behavior of women, but virtually no impact on the behavior of 
                                                 
8 The average monthly operating cost is stipulated to 662 NOK for work training and 8,208 for classroom 
training. Work training amount to 60.8 percent of all programs in our data window which makes the average cost 
662*0.608+8208*0.392 = 3,620 NOK per month.   26
men. For women without children, we find that the job hazard rate is almost identical to that 
of otherwise identical men. However, upon obtaining a job, men’s earnings are approximately 
17 percent higher than women’s earnings, ceteris paribus. Having responsibility for small 
children reduces the women’s job hazards and earnings substantially. For example, a having a 
single child aged 4-6 reduces the female job hazard by 41 percent and the expected earnings 
level by 12 percent.  
4.5  Unobserved heterogeneity 
The correlation structure of the six random individual effects is described in Table 9. We re-
port rank correlation (Kendall’s τ) to avoid the excess influence that low-probability extreme 
(and imprecisely estimated) locations would have on standard correlation measures.
9 There 
seems to be a positive unobserved selection into ALMP in the sense that the treatment pro-
pensity correlates positively with employment propensity. This is somewhat surprising, given 
the strong negative selection on observed variables. Our finding suggest that while ALMP 
participants are negatively selected with respect to key human capital variables such as educa-
tion and work experience, they are positively selected on more intangible factors such as 
“spirit” and motivation (conditional on observed human capital). As expected, the unobserved 
employment propensity also correlates positively with earnings and negatively with the em-
ployment termination propensity. 
Table 9  
Unobserved heterogeneity - Rank correlation (Kendall’s τ) 
 Education  Other  benefits  ALMP  Employment 
termination 
Log earnings 
Employment  -0.043 -0.066 0.323 -0.102 0.315 
Education  -  0.227 0.404 0.256 -0.124 
Other benefits    -  0.025  0.546  -0.250 
ALMP     -  0.008  0.197 
Employment termination        -  -0.244 
 
  Unobserved heterogeneity also explains a substantial fraction of earnings dispersion 
across individuals. From Table 2, we have that the overall standard deviation of log earnings 
is 0.602. By including observed covariates in a log-normal earnings regression, the standard 
                                                 
9 Kendall’s τ is computed on the basis of all possible pairs of individuals (i,j) that can be formed on the ba-
sis of the estimated heterogeneity distribution. A pair { } (,) , (,) ki li kj lj vv vv  said to be concordant with respect to 
variables (k,l) if () ( ) 0 ki kj li lj vvvv −− > and discordant if () ( ) 0 ki kj li lj vvvv − −< . Let ckl be the number of concor-







. Note that 





= ∑ of identical pairs drawn from the same location vector.    27
deviation is reduced to 0.539 (not shown). Through the inclusion of unobserved heterogene-
ity, the estimated standard deviation in the person-specific log earnings distribution is further 
reduced to 0.386 (not shown). This nevertheless implies that each individual is subject to sub-
stantial earnings variability.  
5.  Alternative model specifications and robustness 
We have estimated a number of alternative models, both to test particular hypothesis of eco-
nomic interest and to assess the robustness of our results.  In this section we briefly describe 
these alternative models and the corresponding estimation results. Complete results from all 
the estimations described in this section can be downloaded from our web site 
www.frisch.uio.no/docs/job_search.html.  
5.1  Liquidity constraints 
Existing empirical evidence indicates that the behavioral impacts of UI insurance depend on 
the prevalence of liquidity constraints (Chetty, 2008). For a large fraction of unemployment 
entrants in our dataset (those entering after 1994), we have register-based information on their 
own, as well as their family members’, bank accounts at the end of the year prior to the year 
of entry into unemployment. We define liquidity as the sum of the family account balances 
divided by the square root of the number of family members. We then divide the analysis 
population in two equally sized groups; those with liquidity above the median and those with 
liquidity below the median. We estimate a version of the model described in Section 3 where 
all incentive and duration dependence parameters are allowed to vary between these two 
groups. The most important differences between the two groups are; first, that the transition 
rate to other benefits is significantly higher for job seekers with poor liquidity; second, that 
liquidity-constrained individuals exhibit stronger negative duration dependence in the hazard 
rate to employment; and third, that these individuals also lose a subsequent job much faster 
than non-constrained individuals. These findings may reflect that poor liquidity actually re-
sults from weak labor market attachment in the past, which is also associated with rapid dis-
couragement and high exit probability through other benefits. We find no evidence that job 
seekers with poor liquidity responded particularly strongly to UI exhaustion or to the UI re-
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5.2  Non-modeled re-entries 
As explained in Section 3, re-entries into unemployment (repeat spells) are endogenously 
modeled insofar as they follow from the termination of an observed employment spell. How-
ever, the data also include a number of non-modeled re-entries into unemployment, namely 
those occurring after transitions to education or sickness/disability. These re-entries are thus 
treated as determined outside the model (exogenous). Since the process of re-entry may be 
driven by the same unobserved characteristics that determine modeled outcomes, this repre-
sent a potential source of sorting bias. To assess the importance of this problem we also esti-
mate the model without including non-modeled re-entry spells. It turns out that while the in-
clusion of these spells does have some impact on the estimated effects of past unemployment 
(lagged duration dependence) it only has minor impacts on the parameters discussed in this 
paper.  
5.3  Part-time work 
UI claimants are obliged to report any part-time or occasional work that they perform while 
claiming benefits. If the earnings are X percent of previous full-time earnings, the benefit for 
the corresponding period is also reduced by X percent. These part-time work spells are re-
corded in the data, and in one version of the model we have included transitions to part-time 
work as an additional endogenous event (in exactly the same fashion as we include ALMP; 
see Section 3). The results from this exercise indicate that part-time and occasional work may 
serve as important stepping-stones towards more satisfactory employment. Otherwise, the re-
sults are very similar to those reported in Section 4. The reason why we left part-time work 
out of our preferred model is that we suspect measurement errors to be large. In particular, we 
do not systematically record part-time work for non-claimants. We also suspect that part-time 
work sometimes indicates that a satisfactory job is really found, but that it for some reason is 
difficult to start working full-time immediately (in which case our stepping-stone effect will 
be biased upwards). 
5.4  Unobserved heterogeneity 
While our preferred model is obtained on the basis of an AIC criterion (resulting in a joint 
discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity with 27 support points), we have of course 
also estimated the model with fewer support points, including only one (no unobserved het-
erogeneity). The results from the latter model are reported in full on our web page. Unsurpris-
ingly, these results are significantly different from those reported in the paper, particularly   29
with respect to the various duration dependence baselines. The “approach” towards the pre-
ferred model is smooth, however, and most of the estimated parameters are close to their “fi-
nal” values after the inclusion of 10-15 points in the heterogeneity distribution. We also con-
tinued to include more points in the heterogeneity distribution after the AIC criterion was sat-
isfied. However, apart from the heterogeneity parameters themselves (locations and probabili-
ties), no parameters were visibly affected by this model extension. We terminated our likeli-
hood improvement attempts after 35 support points. 
6.  Conclusion 
An important feature of the UI system is the maximum duration by which job seekers are al-
lowed to claim benefits without being forced into some form of activity. We have found that 
the determination of this parameter involves a number of tradeoffs. It is clearly the case that 
the longer benefits can be claimed without activity requirements, the higher the reservation 
wage and longer the time a typical job seeker uses to find a job. However, this is not only 
waste of time. Job search turns out to be a productive activity, and expected earnings derived 
from the first job match increase with as much as 13 percent during the first half year of job 
search. Moreover, generous job search conditions imply that fewer job search spells are ter-
minated without a job being found at all.  Fastidiousness declines significantly during the 
months just prior to UI exhaustion. This is mirrored in a 50 percent rise in the job hazard as 
well as in a 10 percent decline in the level of accepted earnings, ceteris paribus. 
  Actual participation in labor market programs also involves some conflicting mecha-
nisms. There is initially an adverse unemployment lock-in effect that needs to be traded off 
against the apparently favorable human capital effects that come into play when the program 
has lasted for some time and/or is completed. On average, our findings suggest that program 
participation causes a 1.2 month increase in overall unemployment duration (including the 
participation period). However, it also causes a 2 percentage point increase in the probability 
that the unemployment spell eventually ends with a job. Program participation also tends to 
improve the quality of the job match. On average, program participation yields an initial earn-
ings bonus of around 2.5 percent. Nevertheless, in terms of total earnings generated during the 
five year period after entry into unemployment, we find that the adverse unemployment dura-
tion effect dominates the favorable employment and earnings effects. In addition, programs 
are costly to administer. Hence, if we consider the time spent in program as being without 
economic value other than through the earnings it potentially generates later on, a cost-benefit 
calculation is bound to conclude that the programs are not worth their price. However, many   30
programs (around 60 percent) involve some form of subsidized employment. If we assume 
that subsidized work has an economic value of at least 35 percent of non-subsidized work and 
abstract from general equilibrium effects, the cost-benefit analysis over a five-year period 
comes out with a favorable conclusion.  
  We conclude that in order to justify the high level of labor market program activity in 
Norway one cannot focus exclusively on programs as a means to promote the participants’ 
human capital and later employment careers. The most important benefits of ALMP’s actually 
seem to come from two other sources. First, they offset the moral hazard problems embedded 
in unemployment insurance systems. Activity requirements effectively reduce the leisure as-
sociated with being a UI claimant and, hence, encourages active job search and discourages 
excessive “choosiness”. Although we have shown i this paper that the latter of these effects 
implies a reduction in the level of accepted earnings from the first job, a quick entry into ordi-
nary employment may provide a stepping stone towards better paid jobs. Second, active pro-
grams represent an alternative way of exploiting the “waiting time” until an ordinary job can 
be found. Many program participants contribute directly to the production of valuable goods 
and services, and a short increase in overall unemployment duration (including the participa-
tion period) may be considered a price worth paying for this benefit.  
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